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Abstract. The aim of the article is to argue that the interpretations of quantum 
mechanics and of probability are much closer than usually thought. Indeed, a 
detailed analysis of the concept of probability (within the standard frequency theory 
of R. von Mises) reveals that the latter concept always refers to an observing system.  
The enigmatic role of the observer in the Copenhagen interpretation therefore derives 
from a precise understanding of probability. Besides explaining several elements of 
the Copenhagen interpretation, our model also allows to reinterpret recent results 
from „relational quantum mechanics‟, and to question the premises of the „subjective 
approach to quantum probabilities‟.  
 
1. Introduction. 
 
 A key element of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is the role 
played by the observer, or rather the observing system. The observing system, or the 
measurement, makes the wave function collapse. By the same token it causes the 
„measurement problem‟: why is an observing system any different from any „normal‟ physical 
system, e.g. the natural environment - which leaves the wave function of the system in its 
superposition state ? Bohr and Heisenberg are reputed to be the first to have recognized the 
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role of the observing system, giving an „instrumentalist‟ or „operationalist‟ flavor to quantum 
mechanics: to some, reality seemed to depend on, or be determined by, apparatuses. Since 
then a further shift in the interpretation of quantum mechanics has been proposed by several 
authors – a shift towards subjectivism, in which it is now the observer as a human being, 
including his or her mind, who plays the starry role: along with quantum information theory, 
Alice and Bob entered the scene. The degree of subjectivism is of course different for 
different authors, but the most radical of these interpretations (see Section 3.3.) almost impart 
the impression that quantum mechanics „happens in the head of the subject‟, and leave the 
reader wondering where the objective basis of science is gone. Besides the standard 
Copenhagen interpretation, we will in the following investigate some of the better known new 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely „relational quantum mechanics‟ of Rovelli and 
others [1-4], and the Bayesian or subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities of Bub, 
Caves, Fuchs, Schack and others [5-7]. As an excellent representative of the classical 
Copenhagen interpretation, we will use Peres [8-10], especially his textbook [8]. 
 The aim of the present article is to show that the role of the „observer‟ in quantum 
mechanics is not new: it is exactly the same as he/she/it plays in classical probability theory. 
More precisely, we will argue 1) that a precise definition of probability (à la von Mises) 
always refers to an observing system, 2) that (as a consequence) the instrumentalist aspects of 
the Copenhagen interpretation stem from the probabilistic nature of quantum phenomena, and 
3) that also other interpretations of quantum mechanics [1-7] can be re-interpreted, less 
radically, within the standard interpretation of probability. The „understanding‟ of quantum 
mechanics, beyond the formalism, would therefore heavily draw on the interpretation of the 
concept of probability.      
 Many a physicist will wonder whether anything new can be learned from the 
interpretation of probability. Is everything about probability not entirely said with 
Kolmogorov‟s simple axioms, dating from 1933 [11] ? Unfortunately not, else probability 
theory would not be termed the branch of mathematics in which it is easiest to make mistakes 
(Ref. [12], p. 4). Indeed, in order to apply probability calculus to the real world as it should 
one needs to know to which type of events exactly to apply it; in other words, one needs an 
interpretation of the concept of probability, beyond Kolmogorov‟s axioms. The most 
widespread interpretation in science is the relative frequency interpretation (in the limit of 
infinite trial series), which is generally attributed to Richard von Mises [13-14]. (References 
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[13-14] offer, in our view, the most rigorous treatment of all aspects of probability theory, 
both foundations and calculus, and in particular their link.) However, other interpretations 
such as the classical interpretation of Laplace, the propensity interpretation of Popper, and the 
subjective interpretation, associating probability with „degree of belief‟, exist (general 
references are [15-17] and the condensed [28] Ch. 4). As said, the subjective interpretation 
regains a vivid interest in the field of quantum mechanics [5-7].  
As a matter of fact (and much to our own surprise), it appears that the notion of 
probability contains a few implicit notions, and that a minimalistic definition as P(R) = 
probability of result R = limn∞ {number of occurrences of R / total number (n) of trials}, 
does not guarantee flawless application, as we showed in Ref. [18]. The main result of [18] is 
simple: in order to calculate P(R) (with R a result, outcome, or event), that „R‟ needs to be 
precisely specified, including the „initializing‟ and „probing‟ conditions in which it occurs. In 
other words, P(R) can be completely different from P(R‟) if R‟ is (at first glance) the same 
event as R but probed or measured in different circumstances (see Section 2). Let us stress 
that our conceptual study of probability is derived in a straightforward manner from von 
Mises‟ probability theory, which is explicitly objective. In view of the recent debate in 
quantum mechanics, we believe it is not superfluous to recall that not only von Mises but also 
other fathers of probability theory as Kolmogorov and his pupil Gnedenko, were well aware 
of, and actively engaged in, the objective – subjective debate (making it certainly more than 
100 years old). They offered vigorous arguments in favor of an objective interpretation of 
probability (see e.g. Ref. [13] p. 75ff., 94ff., and Ref. [19] p. 26ff.). What did come as a 
surprise to us, is that a detailed conceptual study of the notion of probability appears so useful 
– it is an understatement to say that physicists are not used to such conceptual analyses. But 
we believe it is necessary to first explore in detail the physical and intuitive foundations of a 
concept as probability, before plunging into calculations. Else one may well derive results that 
look professional, but lead nowhere. To the best of our knowledge, the aspects we will 
highlight here have not been studied in detail elsewhere. 
Before turning to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, we will in the next Section 
briefly recall the main results of Ref. [18]. Let us emphasize that our results may only be fully 
convincing if presented as a whole and in detail; we therefore ask the reader to consult [18] if 
necessary. 
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2. Results of the detailed interpretation of probability of Ref. [18]. 
 
 Typical textbooks state that probability is attributed to „random events‟.  When we 
want to experimentally determine the probability of the event e = „this coin shows result R = 
heads‟, we all know what to do: we toss the coin many times and determine the relative 
frequency of heads (P(e) = P(R) = ½ for a regular coin). Now if we are looking for the in-
principle conditions on which P(e) depends (these in-principle conditions will become 
essential in quantum mechanics), we quickly realize that these at least contain the initial and 
final conditions of the tosses: the way we start them and probe (observe) the result. Normal 
tossing involves a vigorous momentum to start with, and normal probing takes place, for 
instance, on a table. We could obtain any result for P(e) if we would put glue on the table and 
launch the coin with a sufficiently refined momentum distribution (with sufficient 
technological trickery we could moreover make the whole affair look perfectly random and 
regular if we wanted, but that isn‟t important here). Therefore, in principle P(e) depends on 
the „initializing‟ and „probing‟ or „observing‟ conditions in which e occurs. (Equivalently, 
one could say that P(e) depends on the initializing and observing subsystem that form, 
together with the die, the probabilistic system, or „p-system‟ [18]. In our example the 
initializing subsystem is typically a randomizing hand, and the observing subsystem a table.) 
In above example „e‟ is a probabilistic event „created‟ by a human; in such an artificial 
experiment we have no problem to conceive the role of probing or observing conditions. Now 
does the above mentioned dependence also hold for natural probabilistic phenomena 
(diffusion, collisions, quantum phenomena,…) that happen every instant everywhere in the 
universe without anybody observing ? In [18] we argued that the role of the initiating and 
probing conditions is taken here by the environment (temperature, force fields etc. determine 
the probabilities in question in an obvious way). At any rate, when we verify or measure the 
probabilities which e.g. quantum theory predicts for an event occurring in a specified 
environment, we need to do the experiment in that same environment or in a lab reproducing 
the environment – thus the initiating and probing conditions reappear. Therefore, it is safe to 
generalize above simple idea [18]: for calculating or determining a probability, as soon as 
things get somewhat subtle, one should remember the in-principle dependence on the 
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initiating and probing conditions (or the environment if one prefers). (Ref. [18] proposes a 
detailed definition of probability that includes these conditions
1
.) 
However simple the idea, inspection of the countless paradoxes which the fascinating 
topic of probability has to offer, left us little doubt that it is this idea which is at the basis of 
all these paradoxes. Von Mises exposes many tens of them in his works [13-14]; many 
textbooks contain at least a few. Let us look at a few well-known examples. Bertrand‟s 
paradox (dating from the end of the 19
th
 century) goes as follows: “A chord is drawn 
randomly in a circle. What is the probability that it is shorter than the side of the inscribed 
equilateral triangle ?” Since a chord can be drawn randomly in a variety of ways [22] (as may 
not be obvious at first reading), the answer is simply undefined. Each method of random 
drawing (read: each initializing condition of the random experiment) leads to a specific 
probability. In other words: to have a defined probability, one needs a defined initializing 
condition. The infamous „Monty Hall‟ problem [23], amply discussed and popularized in the 
nineties in all media by Marilyn vos Savant, will be seen to become almost trivial if one 
remembers that, here to, one looks for a relative frequency of an outcome R of a well-defined 
experiment
2
. 
 Essential for the following is the role of the probing or observing conditions. Any 
numerical value of any probability depends, in principle, on the observing conditions, as was 
already suggested by the coin example [18]. In a macroscopic and thoroughly known case as a 
coin toss, when asking a person to determine „the probability of heads for this coin‟, no-one 
feels compelled to specify these conditions. Everyone assumes that everyone knows what is 
meant with the event „e‟. But in the quantum world we don‟t know much anymore; as we will 
see further the conditions become essential.  
However, on further inspection they play a crucial role too in classical systems, 
namely to safeguard the objective nature of probability. A question that almost automatically 
pops up in discussions on probability, is: “but doesn‟t probability depend on our knowledge 
?” (It is this question that opens the door to subjective interpretations of probability.) Consider 
for instance a regular die throw. „For me‟, the probability that a 6 shows up is 1/6th, but „for 
Alice‟, who is equipped with a sophisticated camera and can register the die movement in 
                                                          
1
 Note that in this definition the initiating conditions, the observing conditions, and the environment intervene in 
an exactly symmetric manner. 
2
 R = „I win a car by switching‟; P(R) = 2/3.  
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real-time until it comes to a halt, that same probability seems to be either 0 or 1. Or, „for me‟ 
the chance that I will catch a bus during the next 10 minutes is 10/60 (I know that one bus 
passes per hour). But someone who sits in a tower and has a lookout over the city traffic 
might disagree [18].  
It is not difficult to devise paradoxical situations as these, but they stem from a neglect 
of the fact that P(R) is only well-defined – only exists – if R is well-defined, including its 
probing conditions. Doing an experiment in which a die is thrown and probed in the usual 
way is one thing; throwing and then monitoring it in real-time with a camera is another. These 
two events are different due to different observing conditions (or observing subsystems); for 
that reason the probabilities are different, not because of two different knowledge states or 
degrees of belief (see Appendix for a detailed argument).  
Now, as we show in some detail in the Appendix, the subjective shift is extremely 
tempting. Indeed, it is obvious that in above die example one could introduce conditional 
probabilities (e.g. the probability that the upper surface shows 6 at halt if it is given that the 
surface shows 6 one sec before the die comes to a halt as observed with a camera). Any 
probability can in principle be considered a conditional probability (see Kolmogorov,  Ref. 
[11] , p. 3; Ref. [19] p. 67). And the expression “if it is given that” seems to be equivalent, in 
this context, to “if it is known that”, thus invoking the knowledge state of an observer in a 
subliminal manner. This may be the origin of why subjective interpretations are so popular, as 
we argue in the Appendix.  
If we assume that probability theory is part of science, then it should necessarily 
concern „objects‟ that can be separated from the „subject‟ (we): if our minds would play any 
role, i.e. determine the objects (= probabilities) under study, scientific, i.e. „objective‟ 
comparison of results would be impossible (in the context of quantum mechanics, this idea 
has been analyzed and stressed by Bohr at several occasions). In [18] we showed that if one 
wants to see probability as an objective measure, there is a simple way to do so: attribute it to 
events under defined probing conditions. True, „objective‟ (and „observer-independent‟ even 
more) is a somewhat tricky word here: it means „identical (and mind-independent) for all 
observers performing identical experiments‟, so objective in the scientific sense – even if the 
observer, or rather the observing subsystem, is in a sense part of the system ! (Remember that 
the observing subsystem is part of the p-system.) It is therefore clear that in objective 
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accounts „observer‟ must be understood as a physical system without a mind. The subjective 
shift is equivalent to including a human mind in the „observer‟.    
  A last remark that will prove useful is the following. In [18] we argued, following 
authors as von Mises, Popper [20], and van Fraassen ([21], Ch. 6) that it is often helpful to 
remember that probability belongs to „experiments‟, rather than just events: probability theory 
concerns repeatable and real physical tests or experiments. The „event space‟ of axiomatic 
probability theory [11] is a vague concept
3
. Probability theory is not only a mathematical 
theory: it applies to real-world events occurring under repeatable conditions. 
 Let us now see how these findings compare to the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  
 
3. Conceptual link between probability and quantum mechanics. 
 
3.1. Objective probability and the Copenhagen interpretation. 
 
In view of what we learned above, it seems that the importance of the „observer‟ in 
quantum mechanics should not surprise us, if quantum phenomena are probabilistic 
phenomena. One of the key ideas of the Copenhagen interpretation is expressed in following 
quote by Bohr, taken from his 1935 reply to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in their debate on 
the completeness of quantum mechanics. “The procedure of measurement has an essential 
influence on the conditions on which the very definition of the physical quantities in question 
rests” [25]. Is this passage understandable ? (we did not understand it before our investigation 
[18]). In Ref. [24] Bell not only identifies above passage as the essential ingredient of Bohr‟s 
reply, but also admits and details his complete incapacity to understand it (p. 58). However, 
within the objective interpretation of probability of Section 2, it seems we can simply re-
interpret what Bohr claims. It appears now that Bohr says nothing else than that quantum 
properties are determined by the observing conditions or in other words the observing 
subsystem
4
. But we found in former Section that this dependence holds – in principle - for all 
                                                          
3
 It is of course mathematically well-defined within a system as Kolmogorov‟s; but it does not say to which 
events probability theory can be applied. Many or most „events‟ are not probabilistic. 
4
 This „determination‟ can of course only materialize through an interaction between the trial system and the 
observer system (think of how any classical probability is measured). This idea is elaborated by Bohr in Ref. 
[25] by invoking the „quantum of interaction‟. 
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probabilistic systems, quantum or classical. For classical systems one needs some attention to 
find examples of the influence of the observing system; in quantum mechanics the „in 
principle‟ becomes basic - as correctly emphasized by Bohr. As an example: the probability 
that an x-polarized photon passes a y-polarizer obviously depends on x and y. Any numerical 
probability value, quantum or classical, is a function of the analyzer / detector parameters. 
Seen from this angle, one would think that the „measurement problem‟ becomes, in 
essence, transparent. The collapse of the wave function (the selection of one of the outcomes 
of the experiment that is encoded in the wave function), strongly reminds us, of course, of 
classical probabilistic measurements in which the observing subsystem selects one possibility 
(e. g. „six up‟ in a die throw selected by a table). We believe the concept of collapse contains 
in essence no more mystery than the „determination‟ of a classical probabilistic system during 
the act of observation. (This does not preclude that more refined mechanisms might underlie  
the simple probabilistic manifestation that emerges from these mechanisms.)       
Let us have a look at a few salient statements of Peres in Ref. [8]. “A state is 
characterized by the probabilities of the various outcomes of every conceivable test” ([8] p. 
24, where these „tests‟ should be understood as pertaining to an experimental set-up). A little 
further: “Note that the word „state‟ does not refer to the photon by itself, but to an entire 
experimental setup involving macroscopic instruments. This point was emphasized by Bohr 
[…]” ([8], p. 25). We are by now inclined to say that these quotes hold for any probabilistic 
system, quantum or classical. To a die throw one could obviously associate a „state‟ 
consisting of the six discrete results and their probabilities. At any rate, also the probability of 
an outcome of a die throw depends crucially on the „entire experimental setup‟ that is used to 
perform it, in particular the initial and probing conditions (Section 2). Probabilities, and in 
particular quantum probabilities, are measures pertaining to repeatable experiments, not 
objects per se [18]. Compare to following passage of [8] (p. 73): “The notion of density 
matrix – just as that of state vector – describes a preparation procedure; or, if you prefer, it 
describes an ensemble of quantum systems, whose statistical properties correspond to the 
given preparation procedure”. In Section 2 we termed the „preparation‟ of this quote the 
„initializing‟ of the probabilistic system. We can review here only a few of the instrumentalist 
passages of [8], but it appears they all can be interpreted by using the same notions as 
probability theory already uses, explicitly or implicitly. 
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Note that we do not claim that every element of the Copenhagen interpretation has its 
counterpart in probability theory (à la von Mises). Notably, the latter has no uncertainty 
relations, neither the corresponding commutation relations. But interestingly enough, even 
these seem to be foreshadowed by an adequate interpretation of probability. The commutation 
relations stipulate, among other things, which observables A and B can be measured 
simultaneously. Now, within von Mises‟ framework, P(A&B), the joint probability of A and 
B, is defined only if A and B can be measured by an experimental set-up that allows to 
measure A, B, and A and B (combined) by using the same observing system
5
. In symbols one 
has: PC(A.B) = PC(A).PC(B|A), with C the same experimental conditions in the three 
experiments. One could equally well write P(A.B|C) = P(A|C).P(B|A.C): see the Appendix. In 
other words, within von Mises‟ probability theory the question of simultaneous measurement 
of two random quantities is already crucial – just as it is crucial in quantum mechanics. Von 
Mises warns explicitly that not of all quantities A and B the joint distribution exists; it is not 
difficult to find conditions C in which A and B cannot be simultaneously measured. We see 
here again that (via the commutation relations) quantum mechanics fills in, in a stringent 
manner, the conditions under which to apply classical probability theory in the atomic and 
subatomic realm
6
.   
Let us note, finally, that probability theory is less authoritative than the Copenhagen 
orthodoxy. On the Copenhagen interpretation, the commutation relations stipulate not only 
which observables can be measured simultaneously, but also which observables exist 
simultaneously. Note that this is indeed the second essential ingredient of Bohr‟s answer to 
EPR, besides above passage. (As we read it, Bohr‟s argument can thus be summarized as 
follows: measurement brings observables into being through an inevitable interaction with an 
                                                          
5
 This follows from von Mises‟ exposition in Ref. [14] pp. 26 – 39, even if it is not entirely explicit. The key 
procedure is the following: start from two collectives (experimental series), one in which A is measured, one for 
B. If A and B are „combinable‟, then one can construct a collective for the joint measurement of A and B, and 
determine their joint probability. On a straightforward interpretation of von Mises, the latter collective must 
correspond to an experimental series using the same equipment as used for measuring A and B separately. (Thus 
a „joint‟ measurement is a „simultaneous‟ measurement.) Von Mises warns explicitly that not just of any A and B 
the joint probability can be measured. 
6
 At this point it is tempting to suggest a link with the notorious quantum non-locality or contextuality revealed, 
e.g., by the theorems of Bell and Kochen-Specker. Indeed, we argued that a typical quantum correlation as 
P(A.B) has to be understood as P(A.B|C) and thus depends in principle on C, i.e. on all the parameters of the set-
up, for instance polarizer or magnet directions. Quantum mechanics shows that the „in principle‟ should be taken 
seriously: quantum probabilities are „contextual‟, i.e. do depend on the whole experimental context – as already 
suggested by the notion of probability. But we cannot elaborate this point here, and leave the difficult question 
whether this is „all there is to quantum non-locality‟ open.   
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observing system; if two observables cannot be measured simultaneously, they do not exist 
simultaneously.) Probability theory is of course silent about the existence of outcomes when 
they are not measured (i.e. about their being determined by hidden variables, whether 
measured or not). Laplace and Einstein famously argued that probabilities hide causal 
mechanisms - an option that is fully left open by probability theory, but prohibited by the 
Copenhagen interpretation.   
              
3.2. Objective Probability and Relational Quantum Mechanics. 
 
An interesting interpretation of quantum mechanics is due to Rovelli [1-4], who 
termed it „relational quantum mechanics‟ (RQM). The essential idea of this account is to 
consider any state vector as relative to an observer, or rather observing system (for Rovelli 
anything can be an „observer‟, e.g. an atom). A relevant quote is this: “The notion rejected 
here is the notion of absolute, or observer-independent, state of a system; equivalently, the 
notion of observer-independent values of physical quantities. The thesis of the present work is 
that by abandoning such a notion (in favor of the weaker notion of state – and values of 
physical quantities - relative to something), quantum mechanics makes much more sense” [1] 
(Quote 1). Just as Einstein‟s rejection of the obsolete notions of absolute time and 
simultaneity allowed to reinterpret the Lorentz transformations, Rovelli conjectures that the 
replacement of absolute states by relative states allows to found quantum mechanics on more 
solid grounds [1].   
Now, according to classic quantum theory [8], a quantum state represents outcomes of 
an experiment and their probabilities (see Section 3.1.). But we have argued in Section 2 that 
these probabilities necessarily depend on, e.g., the observing subsystem; therefore, also the 
corresponding outcomes necessarily depend on the observing subsystem
7
. But this seems to 
offer an explanation of the main claim of relational quantum mechanics (Quote 1), stating that 
quantum states and the physical quantities they represent are relative to an observer. They 
indeed are: they depend on it, or are determined by it. Therefore, our objective probability 
                                                          
7
 For instance, a certain judiciously constructed die throw experiment, containing as probing system a table 
covered with glue, may have as unique outcome R = 6, with probability 1. With another probing system (remove 
the glue) the outcomes are 1,…,6 with probability 1/6. Probabilities and outcomes depend, in principle, on the 
probing.  
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interpretation of quantum mechanics provides a natural basis to understand the relational 
nature of quantum mechanics. 
In Ref. [2] the authors analyze the EPR paradox. The „solution‟ (or rather 
interpretation) of this paradox within RQM “consists in acknowledging that different 
observers can give different accounts of the actuality of the same physical property” [2]. Let 
us have a closer look at the argument (as we read it). According to RQM, the state vector  of 
a system S is relative to observer A (Alice), in the sense that  represents a coding of the 
outcome of previous interactions between S and A. Now, crucially, these interactions “are 
actual only with respect to A” (Quote 2, our italics); “the state  is only relative to A:  is the 
coding of the information that A has about S” [2]. In the EPR gedankenexperiment, involving 
a spin ( ) singlet state for a pair of electrons I and II, Alice may measure at t0 e.g. z,I = +1; 
then she knows that Bob necessarily will find at times t ≥ t0 (time relative to her), that z,II = -
1 (similar for x,I and x,II)
8
. Nevertheless, at t0 z,II has no reality for Alice (there is no 
element of reality corresponding to z,II for Alice): see Quote 2, or “recall that a property of S 
is actual relative to A only if substantiated in a correlation between A and S” [2]. Therefore, 
the EPR argument brakes down from the start (it‟s not even necessary to consider the second 
part, involving x,II). Since there is nothing real happening with II for Alice (only her 
subjective knowledge state about II changes), a fortiori nothing real is transmitted, so as a 
bonus RQM saves locality [2].  
The key argument is therefore that, in the case of quantum properties, it makes no 
sense that A talks about a property that is not instantiated by an interaction with her: it does 
not exist. This is a radical stipulation; even if some quantum results (Bell‟s theorem) hint into 
this direction, it remains a matter of taste whether one wants to accept it or not. Ref. [2] is of 
course not intended to be a logical refutation of EPR within a generally accepted theory. EPR 
may equally well remain on their position and emphasize that the perfect correlation between 
z,I and z,II, and the fact that Alice can predict with certainty what Bob will measure, remain 
serious arguments for the simultaneous existence of both quantities (for all observers). True, 
Bell‟s theorem has made, for many physicists, such a claim much less plausible; but we 
believe much remains to be said about the famous theorem [8, 24, 26, 30]. 
                                                          
8
 In the notation of RQM properties should, for obvious reasons, always be indexed to refer to the observer, so 
the authors of [2] rather use symbols as z,I
A
. But we can simplify here without loss of information. 
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There is one radical aspect of RQM that can be re-interpreted within our classical 
probabilistic interpretation in a less drastic manner. Indeed, it is not fully clear to us to which 
observer the singlet state 
 = (1/√2) {│uI,+>.│uII,->  - │uI,->.│uII,+>} 
refers in RQM, since it contains information relative to two observers according to that 
interpretation. In [2] the authors show that RQM is compatible with the classic quantum result 
encoded in , namely that for all electron pairs z,I = - z,II (their argument is refined in [4]), 
but they reject the idea that  could be relative to a „superobserver‟ [2] or to „the Lorentz 
frame that we arbitrarily choose to perform our calculations‟ [10] (Refs. [10] and [29] accept 
such an observer).  
If we interpret quantum mechanics within an objective probability approach, we 
believe one should not have such scruples vis-à-vis a superobserver. Indeed, as stated above, 
within von Mises‟ framework the joint probability P(A&B) is defined if A and B can be 
measured by an experimental set-up that allows to measure A, B, and A and B (combined) by 
using the same observing system. Therefore, classical probability theory suggests that the 
superobserver in the EPR experiment is simply Cecil, the observer who can measure z,I and 
z,II simultaneously. Such an observer manifestly exists (cf. the well-known coincidence 
measurements done to verify Bell‟s theorem9); the natural interpretation seems to be that  is 
relative to Cecil. But  can also be used as a theoretical tool by Alice and Bob. Classical 
probability theory suggests that what really matters is the experimental set-up used (this 
defines the „observer‟), not really where the human being using the apparatus or calculating 
the probabilities in question „sits‟. Indeed, probability theory allows to predict and use single-
event probabilities such as P(A) and P(B), corresponding to the measurement of just A or B 
(the observer measures one quantity by using one part of the observing system), but also of 
double-event or joint probabilities such as P(A&B) (the observer measures both): the „magic‟ 
is that single and double-event probabilities are mutually linked by objective probabilistic 
laws (or regularities). On our view, this is in perfect harmony with quantum mechanics 
(which seems a relief). The information coded in  reveals such an objective probabilistic 
regularity that is expressed as a function of single-event states. Analogously as in the classical 
probabilistic case, the joint probabilities coded in  (such as P(+&-) = P(-&+) = 1/2) exist for 
                                                          
9
 The existence of such a simultaneous measurement is allowed by a vanishing commutator [ z,I, z,II]. 
13 
 
the same apparatus as the single-event probabilities (coded in the│ui,j>), even if, so to speak, 
Cecil uses both arms of the EPR experimental set-up, and Alice and Bob use only one.     
 Therefore, however interesting we find RQM, we could relax such statements as “[…] 
we can never juxtapose properties relative to different systems” [2]; or in any case we should 
treat this phrasing with much care. What is meant is that z,I and z,II cannot be juxtaposed 
since relative to different observers. We believe the better reading is that z,I and z,II can be 
juxtaposed
10
 because relative to one and the same apparatus, so relative to one real observer 
(Cecil, the apparatus). In sum, science sometimes allows to predict probabilistic regularities 
for double events. These double-event probabilities necessarily involve a joint observing 
system (e.g. a table on which two dice can be observed, or two arms in an EPR experiment). 
If these objective regularities predict P(+&+) = P(-&-) = 0, as in the EPR case, then we 
(Alice, Bob, Cecil - the humans) know that if  z,I = +1, z,II necessarily = -1. Note that our 
interpretation in reality only deals with „observing systems‟.      
    
3.3. Von Mises Probability and Subjective Quantum Probability. 
 
The subjective interpretation of quantum probability is vigorously defended in recent 
Refs. as [5-7]. Let us remark from the beginning that we do not intend to scrutinize the many 
surprising statements these articles contain. We indeed believe, in view of the centennial 
history of the subjective – objective debate in probability theory, that it may well be 
impossible to convert adherents of the subjectivist interpretation to an objectivist position 
(and v.v.): the premises seem too different; they may ultimately be metaphysical; and 
identical facts can be interpreted in different ways. We will therefore not venture into a 
detailed analysis of [5-7], but just relate a few statements of [7] to our arguments of the 
preceding Sections. 
Let us first recall that strong arguments against the subjective interpretation were 
already offered by the fathers of probability theory (Section 1). More recently, the latter 
interpretation has been incisively criticized in the case of applications in medicine, 
criminology etc. [27], and in general [28, Ch. 4]. One of the main ideas of von Mises (Ref. 
[13] pp. 96-97) and Refs. [27-28] is that it is extremely dangerous to attribute probability to 
                                                          
10
 Operationally by Cecil if one likes, but even theoretically by Alice and Bob. 
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propositions (except if the link with experiments is unambiguous): the danger of running into 
unscientific interpretations is huge
11
. The main question that remains unanswered within the 
subjective approach is, it seems: if probabilities are just subjective degrees of belief of some 
observer, why do observers all over the world measure the same (quantum) probabilities when 
they do the same experiments ? Why do these different observers measure the same electron 
energies in solids, the same wavelengths emitted from atoms, the same EPR state 
probabilities, etc. ? Note that all probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are measured 
or verified by determining relative frequencies, as any experimental physicist will testify.  
The only point of [7] we will briefly comment here is the following. In order to justify 
and substantiate any difference between the subjective interpretation and the usual frequency 
interpretation, the authors (but this remark holds mutatis mutandis for all subjective 
approaches) have to invoke such a highly questionable premise as Lewis‟ „principal principle‟ 
[7], distinguishing objective chance and (Bayesian) probability. Bayesian (real) probability 
(Pr) should satisfy, according to this principle: Pr(E C&D) = q, with E an event, C the 
proposition “the objective chance of E is q” (q is supposed to be the objective chance (!)), and 
D “some other compatible event, e.g., frequency data” [7]. Even if we make abstraction of the 
fact that the probability function „Pr‟ has as argument an improbable mixture of events, 
propositions and data, Lewis‟ principle sounds remarkably circular. What is the use of 
introducing Pr if it is determined by q ? Why not stick to the objective measure q, which the 
authors seem to interpret themselves as von Mises‟ relative frequency ? 
Now, we do not deny that there is a grain of truth in the subjective interpretation. For 
instance when we read: “This approach [the subjective interpretation] underlines the central 
role of the agent, or observer, in the very formulation of quantum mechanics” [7]. We have 
emphasized the role of the observer – as physical system – throughout this text. But we have 
also argued that by attributing probability to experiments, or to composed events including 
observing conditions, probability can be defined in a fully objective manner. True, the 
subjective shift is tempting: in order to make the concept objective, one has to include the 
observing subsystem (not the mental state of a human observer) into the probabilistic system. 
To make things worse, any probability is in reality a conditional probability; and conditional 
probabilities are almost always read „if it is known that‟ (see Appendix) – suggesting a link 
                                                          
11
 For instance, talking about the „probability‟ of the propositions p = „Theory X is correct‟ or p = „Person X is 
guilty‟ makes no sense. Which experiments would have to be performed in order to measure P(p) ? 
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with belief states. But probability theory and quantum mechanics are not psychological 
theories, but theories about repeatable and therefore objective experiments: if we would not 
find the same relative frequencies in the same repeated conditions, we would stop doing 
quantum mechanics and statistics. 
            
4. Conclusion. 
 
The aim of the present article was to show that the interpretations of probability and of 
quantum mechanics are more overlapping than usually thought. The bridge between the two is 
the essential and identical role that the „observer‟ plays in both frameworks. Indeed, a detailed 
conceptual study of probability (within von Mises‟ theory) reveals that any numerical value of 
a probability (P(R)) depends, is determined by, the initial and probing conditions in which R 
occurs. Therefore, any scientific probability is only defined if the observing subsystem is 
defined; it only exists „relative‟ to such an observer system. In a natural environment, when 
nobody looks, the role of the „observer‟ is played by the precise physical conditions imposed 
by the environment (the latter determine the probabilities in exactly the same manner as the 
conditions imposed by a human observer in a laboratory test; more precisely, they intervene in 
an exactly symmetric manner in a precise definition of probability [18]). This simple 
observation allows to interpret many elements of the Copenhagen interpretation: the 
„understandable‟ (and measurable !) ingredient of the Hilbert space formalism are 
probabilities – and these should satisfy the above mentioned dependence on the observing 
system. In classical probabilistic systems this dependence is rarely or never explicitly 
mentioned (everyone knows how to perform and probe a regular die throw, no need to 
mention the exact conditions). But quantum theory has shown that in the quantum realm these 
conditions are stringent and essential. 
Besides revisiting some classical elements of the Copenhagen interpretation [8], we 
could derive the essential claim of relational quantum mechanics [1-4]; relax one of its more 
radical conclusions [2]; and criticize the main premise of the subjective approach to quantum 
mechanics [5-7]. These findings seem to clearly indicate, we believe, that quantum 
mechanics, just as probability theory, is exclusively concerned with interactions between 
inanimate test systems and observer systems; these systems mimicking nature to some degree, 
also when we don‟t look.     
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Appendix. Objective probability and the subjective shift. 
 
 
 Let us have a more detailed look at the example of the die throw in Section 2. One 
may consider the probability of event e1 = “the outcome R = 6 in a regular die throw (probed 
as usual on a table)”. One could also consider the probability of e2 = “R = 6 after a camera has 
registered that R = 6 one microsecond before the die came to a halt”. The probability of e1 = 
P(e1) = 1/6, while P(e2) = 1 (or suppose so). These probabilities are not different because of 
different subjective knowledge states. First note that also for e2 one can define the probability 
without referring to „subjective knowledge‟ or „information‟; P(e2) could be measured by an 
automat
12
. So P(e1) ≠ P(e2), not because someone has a different strength of belief, but 
because e1 ≠ e2: both probabilities concern different events, different experiments, and in 
particular different observing conditions. This is a simple consequence of the basic idea of 
von Mises‟ theory: every probability can be seen as the result of a (series of) experimental 
tests.  
Now since nothing is simple in the foundations of probability, it is at the same time 
true, as is obvious for any practitioner of probability calculus, that P(e2) can also be expressed 
in a manner that invokes, implicitly or explicitly, the status of knowledge of some observer – 
whence a potential confusion. Indeed, P(e2) can be considered a conditional probability, 
                                                          
12
 Such an automated experiment is this: let a robot launch a die, let it select by camera vision those trials that 
show R = 6 one sec before the die comes to a halt, and let it measure on that ensemble R again at full stop of 
the die (all this could be done by a machine). The relative frequency of these results will converge to 1, as our 
robot could determine. 
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namely the probability that R = 6 if it is given that R = 6 one sec before halting; in symbols 
P(e2) = P(e1 | R = 6 one sec before halting). Now it indeed seems that the phrasing “if it is 
given that” is equivalent in this context to “if it is known that”; and therefore one is tempted 
to interpret conditional probability as depending on the knowledge of some observer. 
According to our point of view, this is fine as long as one realizes that this interpretation is a 
shortcut of thought, opening the door to subjective interpretations – it is in any case by no 
means the only interpretation. As we just illustrated, and as is explicitly proven by von 
Mises
13
, conditional probabilities can very well be seen as corresponding to series of 
automated experiments in which no intervention nor belief state of a human agent is 
necessary. We cannot stress enough the fact that one can immediately derive from von Mises‟ 
treatment that such a non-anthropocentric interpretation is valid for all conditional 
probabilities: they all can be seen as describing objective experiments (whether related to 
chance games as in the above case, or to natural phenomena). But is this not a happy 
argument for the homogeneity of probabilistic phenomena ? Under the usual interpretation all 
natural stochastic phenomena occur according to probabilistic laws also without a human 
pondering about them; therefore the same should hold for artificial chance phenomena such 
as die throws
14
. It is worth to emphasize that conditional probabilities can be interpreted in an 
objective way, since they play an essential role in probability theory. Indeed, as already 
implicit in Kolmogorov ([11], p. 3), and explicitly stated by Gnedenko ([19], p. 67), even so-
called unconditional probabilities can be regarded as conditional on the circumstances 
(conditions) of realization. Note that we stressed throughout Ref. [18] that it is useful to 
remember that these conditions are in principle composed. Therefore the natural 
generalization in our model is to replace, if helpful, P(R) by P(R|C) where C contains all 
relevant parameters that describe the initial, final, and „environmental‟ experimental 
conditions.  
     
                                                          
13
 More precisely, one can immediately derive from von Mises (Ref. [14], pp. 22-24) that the usual generic 
expression P(A|B) is the probability that event (result) A occurs in experiments in which also event (result) B 
occurs. All probabilistic concepts, such as conditional probability, are defined by von Mises by using collectives 
– i.e., in short, series of experiments.  
14
 Van Fraassen (Ref. [21], p. 164ff.) gives a more detailed analysis of how subjective interpretations (probability 
linked to ignorance) originating from chance games slip into the objective statistics of physics. Also Gnedenko 
gives an enlightening analysis of the subjective shift ([19], p. 26ff.).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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